America’s Empty Chairs: How Unfilled Ambassadorships Threaten U.S. Global Leadership

Sage Gilbert, University of Chicago

The United States is in an ever-present race to maintain its role as a global superpower. Today, though, it risks losing credibility with allies and leverage with adversaries because nearly a third of its ambassadorships remain unfilled. Ambassadors serve as the primary means by which the U.S. can negotiate agreements, project influence, and assess status, making their absence particularly consequential as international hegemony dynamics shift and countries expand their diplomatic presences. 

As of October 23, 2025, the U.S. has eighty-five vacant ambassadorial posts across its host countries, representing approximately thirty-two percent of all diplomatic posts. Of these, ten nominees are awaiting confirmation from the Senate, stuck in the second step of the constitutional process for ambassadorial appointments. The procedure begins with the President nominating a candidate, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reviewing the nomination and holding hearings if necessary. If the committee approves, the nomination proceeds to a full Senate vote. Once confirmed, the nominee is officially appointed and becomes a formal member of the U.S. State Department.

Under the current administration, the average Senate confirmation process has increased to one hundred and twenty-seven days, reflecting a more than ten percent increase from the prior administration. This is part of a historical pattern that has worsened across presidencies: in March 2018, thirty-eight ambassadorships were vacant during President Donald Trump’s first term, and in December 2021, approximately ninety-three were vacant under President Joe Biden’s administration. Paradoxically, during October’s recent government shutdown, the Senate rapidly confirmed over one hundred ambassadorial nominees through expedited procedures on October 7, demonstrating that delays stem from political will rather than procedural constraints.

Confirming ambassadors while leaving the government unfunded can be perceived as selective efficiency, indicating a breakdown in the process itself and a fundamental misalignment of internal priorities. Such systemic dysfunction, which transcends individual administrations, suggests, and perhaps poses, a larger threat to American national security and America’s role as a hegemonic power.  

While these positions remain vacant and host countries lack U.S. representation, the State Department relies on lower-level officials to serve as stand-ins (or, more formally, chargés d’affaires) to complete daily tasks. Chargés d’affaires are not presidentially nominated or Senate-confirmed, though, which affects their ability to act as long-term, effective ambassadors and to project American influence in their host country.

Among the eighty-five countries without a U.S. ambassador are the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Germany, and South Africa, each of which holds strategic significance for U.S. foreign policy. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have the potential to impact energy and oil policy, counterterrorism ideals, and Iran containment. South Korea serves as a critical defense partner against North Korean aggression and in maintaining stability in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Germany has long been a NATO ally of the U.S. and remains an essential stakeholder in transatlantic diplomacy. A vacant ambassadorial position in South Africa, one of the most influential democracies in Africa, reflects limited involvement (and desire to be involved) in African security and trade. Regardless of what a country has to offer the U.S., though, foreign leaders will always notice when the top U.S. post in their country remains vacant for too long. In turn, the image of the U.S. as a global superpower may diminish. 

Consider the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship: grounded in economic and security cooperation, with a shared focus on ensuring stability in the Gulf region. Saudi Arabia remains a key oil supplier to the U.S., and the two countries maintain substantial bilateral trade. Throughout the Biden administration, though, relations declined to what some analysts called a “new low.” In 2022, for example, Saudi Arabia coordinated with Russia to reduce oil output and bolster prices, much to the dismay of U.S. consumers and markets. In May 2025, however, President Trump chose Saudi Arabia as the first overseas trip of his second term, signaling an effort to restore relations. He secured both Saudi flexibility on oil prices and a $600 billion commitment to invest in the U.S. 

While this relationship is strong, it requires care and diplomacy to ensure Saudi Arabia follows through on the deal. Since January 2025, the U.S. has operated without a confirmed ambassador in Riyadh, relying instead on a chargés d’affaires to engage with Saudi leadership. While President Trump’s personal diplomacy secured the agreement, implementing the investment commitment will require ongoing coordination and high-level communication that necessitate leadership from a Senate-confirmed ambassador. Major deals mean institutional legitimacy, and, without an ambassador, the U.S. lacks the official capacity to ensure commitments are fulfilled.

The vacancy underscores further fragility amid Saudi Arabia’s growing frustration with American security commitments, as demonstrated by China’s unprecedented breakthrough in 2023: facilitating a détente (a deal promoting cooperation) between Saudi Arabia and Iran, restoring relations after seven years of strain. The agreement is more than just a strengthening of the Saudi-Iranian relationship; it represents a “diplomatic win” for China and underscores the United States’ perceived decline in Middle East involvement, especially during a time of immediate recovery from President Biden’s decreased Saudi involvement and President Trump’s current focus on “America First” policies.

After the agreement was signed, a senior Saudi official acknowledged that “China is the only country in a position to both pressure Iran and offer assurances to Saudi Arabia.” As demonstrated by the deal, China is seeking to expand its role as a conflict mediator while increasing its global reach and power. In turn, the U.S.’s leverage as a reliable mediator (and, thus, a hegemony) will decline by default. The détente, which continues to hold in 2025, reflects that Saudi Arabia is working to diversify its ties beyond the U.S. and perhaps to rely less on the U.S. than previously. And, to that point, Saudi Arabia is just a reflection of the many other countries with similar feelings. 

Moreover, without confirmed ambassadors in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. lacks senior officials capable of directly engaging with international leadership on how security interests and the broader global balance of power will be affected. A vacant ambassador post reinforces perceptions of American disengagement and undermines the very relationship the Trump administration is attempting to restore. The contradiction is evident: the administration deems the relationship important enough for a presidential visit and $600 billion in investments, yet not essential enough to prioritize Senate confirmation of a top bilateral diplomat. In the same way that the dysfunction of the ambassadorial confirmation process reflects a misalignment of priorities, this contradiction suggests that American engagement is an unreliable option. More broadly, this case of Saudi Arabia demonstrates how ambassador vacancies are creating opportunities for other countries (namely, China) to expand their global influence at the expense of American presence.

These vacancies have significant stakes in the ongoing competition for power between China and the U.S. China is actively expanding its global footprint, regardless of host countries’ existing relationships with either country. According to the Lowy Institute’s 2024 Global Diplomacy Index, which tracks “the world’s most significant diplomatic networks,” China, with two hundred and seventy-four posts, has exactly three more posts than the U.S. at two hundred and seventy-one. The Index defines “posts” to be embassies, consulates, permanent missions, and representative offices or delegations, and notes that “China is ahead in Africa, East Asia, and the Pacific,” while the U.S. leads in the Americas, Europe, and South Asia. A gap of three may suggest that the countries have similar diplomatic presences. These numbers, however, mask a disparity: while the U.S. remains numerically close to China in posts, the symbolism and productivity of these posts are not comparable, which has greater significance in the race for unipolarity between the two hegemons. This symbolic dimension matters because of the role diplomatic representation plays in measuring international status relations. Status depends on mutual recognition, and, as political scientist Marina Duque argues, “exchanging embassies is a recognition practice that signifies social esteem and implies privileges.” When embassies remain vacant or are staffed only by chargés d’affaires, there is an indication of “deteriorating relations,” with the sending state signaling reduced commitment and a loss of status recognition. Notably, China's current lead stems not from a trend of dramatic expansion (given that it actually operates fewer posts today than in 2019, with two hundred and seventy-six posts), but from maintaining a consistent diplomatic presence. With nearly a third of U.S. embassies remaining vacant, China is actively gaining status recognition and filling the vacuum left by the U.S.’s absence. 

Within that vacuum lies the erosion of the U.S.’s global communications and influence, ultimately undermining American symbolism, power, and strategic readiness. The consequences extend beyond bilateral relationships to core national security interests. Among the eighty-five vacant ambassadorial positions are seats to critical international organizations that promote multilateral diplomacy and international law, including the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, and the United Nations Office at Geneva. These absences create the potential for direct security risks. Without representatives in these bodies and the like, the U.S. cannot participate in shaping international norms, coordinating multilateral responses to emerging threats, or engaging with foreign leaders. Foreign governments will notice these vacancies, and even for the vacancies that are in smaller, seemingly “low-stakes” countries, empty ambassador posts allow for conversations questioning American credibility and commitment. This message of disengagement compounds over time: allies begin to doubt U.S. reliability, competitors find openings for leverage, and partners look elsewhere for leadership. The cumulative effect of these eighty-five vacancies transcends bilateral relationships; it challenges the image and foundation of the U.S. as a hegemon in the international order.

Notes

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2.  “Clarification on the U.S. Ambassador Nomination Process,” U.S. Embassy in South Africa, last modified March 28, 2025, https://za.usembassy.gov/clarification-on-the-u-s-ambassador-nomination-process/.
3. “Vacancies Atop America's Foreign Affairs Agencies Endanger U.S. National Security,” U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, accessed October 30, 2025, https://www.usglc.org/resources/vacancies-atop-americas-foreign-affairs-agencies-endanger-u-s-national-security/.
4. Matt Malis, “Half of Biden’s Ambassador Positions are Vacant. Here’s Why That Matters,” Washington Post, December 8, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/12/08/ambassador-vacancies/ 
5.  S. Res. 412, 119th Congress, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-resolution/412/text.
6.  Matt Egan, “America and Saudi Arabia are Locked in a Bitter Battle Over Oil. The Stakes are Massive,” CNN Business, October 28, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/28/economy/saudi-arabia-biden-opec-oil. 
7.  Stanley Reed, “Saudi Arabia and Russia Extend Oil Production Cuts Through December,” New York Times, September 5, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/05/business/saudi-arabia-russia-oil-cuts.html.
8.  Ji-Hyang, Jang. “Trump’s Second-Term Middle East Strategy and the Reconfiguration of Regional Security.” Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2025. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep72580.
9. Adam Gallagher, Sarhang Hamasaeed, Garrett Nada, “What You Need to Know About China's Saudi-Iran Deal,” United States Institute of Peace, March 16, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal.
10. Anna Jacobs and Dina Esfandiary, “How Beijing Helped Riyadh and Tehran Reach a Detente,” International Crisis Group, March 17, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa-saudi-arabia-iran-china/how-beijing-helped-riyadh-and-tehran-reach-detente.
11.  Lowy Institute, “Global Diplomacy Index 2024: Network Map,” accessed November 3, 2025, https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/.
12.  Marina G. Duque, “Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach,” International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 3 (2018): 577, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy001.  
13.  Bonnie Bley, “World Diplomacy Stocktake: A Shifting of the Ranks,” Lowy Institute, The Interpreter, November 27, 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/world-diplomacy-stocktake-shifting-ranks. 
14. American Foreign Service Association, “Tracker: Current U.S. Ambassadors.”