From Boats to Bullion: Re-centering U.S. Policy on Venezuela

Alexander Boyle, University of Chicago

Since early 2025, Washington has highlighted air and maritime strikes on small boats near Venezuela as a way to stop narcotics from reaching American shores, a policy the Trump administration frames as both counternarcotics and pressure on Nicolás Maduro, whose security forces and allied networks are widely accused of facilitating drug transit through Venezuelan territory. The images are compelling, yet they overlook where the Maduro regime’s real operating revenue is generated and protected. The core revenue sustaining Maduro’s security services and patronage networks comes from illicit gold that is mined in the south, smuggled across borders, refined abroad, and then sold into formal markets. Rather than focusing on kinetic action at sea, the Trump administration should focus on the financial disruption of the gold supply chain, which is more likely to deliver durable leverage and is consistent with law and coalition politics. The U.S. Treasury already identifies Venezuela’s gold sector as a central source of regime financing—a revenue stream that indirectly supports the same military and intelligence actors implicated in facilitating narcotics transit—underscoring that this economic front is both lawful and underused as a lever of pressure.^[1]

The stated rationale for the strikes is counternarcotics: the disruption of drug trafficking networks before their shipments can reach markets in the United States. For the Trump administration, this mission has also functioned as a way to apply pressure on Nicolás Maduro, whose senior military and intelligence officials have been accused by U.S. prosecutors of facilitating cocaine transit through Venezuelan territory. This combination of counternarcotics messaging and political pressure helps explain why the administration has highlighted these operations so prominently.

Independent reporting, however, has raised major concerns. First, the lanes under attack are more often associated with cocaine or marijuana moving toward Caribbean, African, or European nodes rather than fentanyl bound for U.S. cities.^[2] Second, the government has provided limited public evidence that links individual vessels to cartels or U.S. destinations. Several incidents ended with survivors repatriated rather than prosecuted in U.S. courts, preventing exposure of sensitive intelligence but leaving the government’s evidence unexamined.^[3] Third, the strikes create diplomatic friction with close partners. In one instance, after a Colombian civilian was reportedly killed, Colombia protested by recalling its ambassador and urging a halt to further attacks, which complicates cooperation that the United States typically needs for counternarcotics work.^[4]

Despite these concerns, Venezuela has become the primary operating theater for the administration. The country’s long and lightly monitored coastline lies within reach of U.S. naval and air assets on routine deployment, and its geography has made it a key corridor for cocaine shipments leaving Colombia. At the same time, relations between Washington and the Maduro government are deeply adversarial. U.S. agencies have accused senior Venezuelan officials of corruption, smuggling, and involvement with trafficking groups connected to the so-called Cartel of the Suns. The Trump administration has also condemned Maduro’s authoritarianism, human rights violations, and erosion of democratic institutions. Given these factors, maritime strikes near Venezuela serve two connected purposes. They are presented domestically as counternarcotics successes, and they also put political pressure on a government that the United States regards as criminal and destabilizing.

However, this political convenience carries meaningful costs. Operations near foreign exclusive economic zones or in contested maritime areas risk diplomatic protests from neighboring states, and any civilian casualties can prompt human rights concerns that complicate the regional cooperation the United States needs for both counternarcotics efforts and sustained pressure on Maduro.^[5]

A more effective way to weaken the Maduro regime is to target the fiscal networks that finance it, rather than relying on military action near its coast. One of the most important of these financial centers is illicit gold. Gold is portable, easily monetized, and can be converted into foreign currency outside of the formal banking system. In March 2019, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Minerven, Venezuela’s state gold enterprise, and its president. This signaled that gold bullion, the refined gold bars that can enter global markets, had become a central source of income for the regime.^[6] On the ground, extraction in the Orinoco and Amazon regions takes place under the supervision of Venezuelan military units and armed non-state actors that collaborate with state officials. Ore is transferred to middlemen who work with elements of the security forces, moved across borders, refined abroad, and then sold back into the formal financial system. These earnings support the patronage networks that keep the Maduro government in power, including military elites and allied armed groups that operate in the same regions used by narcotics traffickers.^[7]

Recent research shows the scale of this activity. In one analysis, at least eighty-six percent of Venezuela’s gold is produced illegally, and roughly seventy percent is smuggled and laundered outside the country, with a value of roughly 4.4 billion dollars in 2021. The same report identifies Venezuelan military officers, Colombian guerrilla factions, and transnational criminal groups as key actors who control mining sites and smuggling corridors. These are many of the same networks that facilitate cocaine transit through Venezuela, meaning that actions against illicit gold directly pressure the groups the Trump administration claims to target through maritime strikes.^[8]

Gold itself is not illegal, but many of the ways it is extracted and moved across borders violate international standards. Problems arise when documentation is falsified, when brokers launder gold through front companies, or when refiners accept shipments without proper verification. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance establishes risk-based checks for supply chains in conflict-affected areas, and the London Bullion Market Association requires accredited refiners to audit their sourcing practices under its Responsible Gold Guidance. These standards create practical points of leverage because banks and refiners that comply with them can be required to block, review, or report shipments that appear suspicious. As a result, they offer the United States and its partners a path to raise the financial and reputational costs of handling Venezuelan gold that supports regime-aligned networks.^[9]

Maritime strikes sit in a seam between military authorities under Title 10, Coast Guard law enforcement authorities under Title 14, and intelligence authorities under Title 50. While that blend of military, law enforcement, and intelligence authorities allows operations to move quickly, it leaves little room for public scrutiny. The government may release brief video footage, yet the underlying sensor data and intelligence sources remain classified.

In contrast, gold enforcement operates within a single, transparent legal framework that relies on documentary evidence rather than classified intelligence. When Treasury and Justice examine shipping manifests, financial records, refinery intake logs, and satellite imagery, they can construct a clear picture of how Venezuelan gold is extracted, transported, and integrated into foreign markets. This documentary trail allows investigators to identify the brokers who arrange shipments, the refiners who accept them, and the financial intermediaries who facilitate payments. Once these actors are identified, the United States can use sanctions or anti–money laundering authorities to freeze accounts, interrupt transfers, or stop suspicious shipments at ports of entry, all of which erode the financial networks that sustain the regime. Because these actions must be supported by evidence that banks and foreign governments can independently review, gold enforcement invites scrutiny from outside partners and produces pressure that is both public and durable in a way maritime strikes cannot.^[10]

An effective gold strategy still relies on intelligence, but in a different mix. Financial intelligence maps payments, trade finance, and shell companies. Open-source and satellite data show new pits, airstrips, and roads. Human sources and non-governmental reporting document conditions at mines and along borders. Properly compiled, these materials become evidence packets that support designations by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, red-flag advisories from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, seizures and forfeitures by the Department of Justice and Homeland Security Investigations, and coordinated actions by foreign partners. The goal is to publish publicly testable information, consistent with legal constraints and partner sensitivities. This strategy is designed to influence compliance officers and prosecutors, rather than rely on claims that cannot be evaluated in public.^[11]

Several tools are already available to the United States, and none require new legislation. The Treasury has the authority to designate the brokers, front companies, and logistics firms that move Venezuelan gold, which signals to global banks and traders that dealing with these actors carries sanctions risk. FinCEN can issue advisories that describe how illicit gold commonly enters the financial system, prompting institutions to scrutinize transactions that involve unusual routing, unclear origins, or cash-intensive patterns. Justice and Homeland Security can bring cases that target shipments or accounts linked to illicit gold, and a single high-profile forfeiture can significantly shift private sector behavior by showing that enforcement is possible and costly. At the diplomatic level, the State Department can work with partners to standardize refiner rules and information sharing, which helps close gaps that smugglers exploit across borders. These tools collectively create pressure on the networks that extract, move, and monetize Venezuelan gold.

Although all of these authorities are already in place, broad enforcement has been slower than expected. Washington has calibrated its actions around ongoing negotiations with the Maduro government, concerns about harming humanitarian conditions, and the need to secure cooperation from European and regional partners before taking steps that would affect their refiners or financial institutions. Gold enforcement requires detailed evidence that can withstand scrutiny from foreign ministries and courts, so agencies often delay designations until they can compile documentation that satisfies multiple partners. These political and evidentiary considerations make enforcement cautious, even though the legal basis for action has been clear since OFAC revoked Minerven’s limited license in early 2024 and reaffirmed its authority to target Venezuela’s gold sector.^[12]

A durable approach depends on allied venues where refiner standards and anti-money laundering rules have real force. Anti-money laundering (AML) rules require banks, refiners, and traders to verify the legitimacy and origin of the transactions they process. Spain is a practical entry point. Madrid hosts SEMPSA JP, a refiner accredited by the London Bullion Market Association, which is the international association that sets global standards for gold quality and responsible sourcing. SEMPSA JP undergoes regular responsible sourcing audits and operates under Spain’s AML law. Spanish prosecutors, working through Eurojust, the European Union’s agency for coordinating cross-border criminal investigations, carry out joint operations that seize gold bars linked to money laundering schemes. These actions show how gold-based operations can be addressed within EU legal channels. If Spain adopts tighter provenance checks and requires more public auditing aligned with LBMA and OECD guidance, those requirements would apply across the entire single market, reducing the opportunities for suspect Venezuelan material to enter Europe.^[13]

Guyana functions as a key border point because it sits directly along Venezuela’s southeastern frontier, which makes it a natural transit route for gold leaving the Orinoco region. Authorities there report that Venezuelan gold is mixed with local output and sold onward to markets in the United States, Canada, and the Middle East. In response, the government announced a crackdown on smuggling at the urging of U.S. officials, increasing border patrols and monitoring mine regions. The Royal Canadian Mint suspended purchases from a major Guyanese exporter in 2021 due to concerns that Venezuelan gold was mixed into local shipments, and the U.S. Embassy suspended visas for miners suspected of smuggling. Guyana reports roughly 434,000 ounces of annual production, and local estimates suggest that as much as half may be smuggled. These figures support a policy focused on shared provenance controls and cross-border AML enforcement rather than episodic raids.^[14]

A comparison of the two approaches shows why gold enforcement offers a stronger and more sustainable tool than maritime strikes. From a legal standpoint, boat strikes operate in a gray area that blurs the lines between military, maritime policing, and intelligence authorities, while gold enforcement proceeds entirely within established sanctions and anti-money laundering frameworks. The evidentiary basis also differs sharply. Maritime operations rely on classified intelligence that cannot be publicly tested, whereas gold cases produce documentary audit trails that prosecutors, judges, and foreign partners can evaluate. Diplomatically, boat strikes risk incidents and protests from regional governments, which undermine the cooperation the United States needs for any broader pressure campaign. Financial enforcement, on the other hand, is framed as rule-of-law compliance and is more likely to generate coalition support. The results follow the same pattern. Proponents of maritime strikes frame “lives saved” as both the justification for the policy and its intended outcome, yet the claim is difficult to verify. Gold enforcement, by contrast, yields measurable indicators such as seizures and forfeitures, higher refiner compliance, wider price discounts on high-risk gold, and observable reductions in new mining pits and environmental damage.^[15]

Smugglers will adapt by rerouting through new brokers and transit hubs, but these adjustments can be costly and ineffective when refiner standards and enforcement actions are aligned across jurisdictions. Harmonized refiner standards mean that accredited refiners in different countries apply the same provenance checks, which reduces the number of places where illicit Venezuelan gold can be laundered into legitimate supply chains. Synchronized designations enable the United States and its partners to target the same brokers and intermediaries at the same time, preventing smugglers from simply shifting transactions to a different financial center with looser oversight. Enforcement should focus on the political and financial networks that organize and launder the trade rather than on small-scale miners themselves, pairing tighter rules with phased compliance and support for alternative livelihoods. Progress will be gradual, yet early designations and a visible forfeiture can demonstrate momentum as refiner codes and public audits expand over the following six to twelve months.^[16]

Progress can be measured through clear and practical signals. A widening discount on Venezuelan-origin gold compared with global benchmarks, signaling that buyers are willing to pay less for gold from Venezuela because they see it as risky or potentially illicit, would show that traders and refiners perceive greater danger in handling suspect material. A coordinated United States and European Union designation round, ideally joined by Gulf trading hubs, would demonstrate growing coalition momentum. A high-profile forfeiture case against a broker or refiner would reinforce deterrence, while publicly released refiner audits would confirm that responsible sourcing standards are being applied. On the ground, satellite data showing fewer new mining pits along key rivers would indicate environmental and operational impact, and a standing Colombia and United States working group that meets regularly and issues joint statements would mark sustained diplomatic coordination.^[17]

Strikes at sea draw attention, but they leave untouched the military, intelligence, and patronage networks that keep Maduro in power. These are the same networks that U.S. prosecutors have linked to narcotics transit through Venezuelan territory, and they are sustained far more by illicit gold revenues than by the drug routes that maritime operations target. If the purpose of United States policy is to weaken the regime’s ability to finance the officials, armed groups, and intermediaries involved in both smuggling and political repression, then real leverage lies not in the boats that carry narcotics but in the gold that underwrites the system that enables them.

A gold-centered strategy focuses on the flow of money itself, how it is generated, moved, laundered, and where it can be lawfully stopped. It operates through evidence, courts, regulatory standards, and international cooperation rather than through short bursts of force. This approach places pressure directly on the actors who enable both illicit mining and narcotrafficking, and it does so in a way that partners can verify and support.

If Washington’s goal is to constrain the finances of a regime implicated in narcotics transit while avoiding unnecessary regional crises, its policy should shift from dramatic but limited boat strikes to sustained financial pressure on the gold economy that keeps Maduro in power.

Notes

1. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Venezuela-Related Sanctions,” accessed October 31, 2025, https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/venezuela-related-sanctions.
2. Terrence McCoy, Ana Vanessa Herrero, and Samantha Schmidt, “Officials, Locals Undercut Trump Claims about Venezuela Drug Boats,” Washington Post, October 20, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/20/trump-attacks-venezuela-drug-boats/.
3. Alex Horton and Dan Lamothe, “U.S. Military Strikes Four Alleged Drug Boats in Eastern Pacific, Killing 14,” Washington Post, October 28, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/10/28/drug-boat-strike-mexico-pacific-hegseth/; Alex Horton, “U.S. to Repatriate Survivors of Drug Boat Strike to Colombia and Ecuador,” Washington Post, October 18, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/10/18/detainees-drug-boat-us-venezuela-colombia-ecuador/.
4. “Colombia Recalls U.S. Ambassador amid Spat over Boat Strikes,” The Guardian, October 20, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/20/colombia-recalls-us-ambassador-trump
5. Alex Horton, “U.S. Kills Six in Latest Strike on Alleged Drug Boat,” Washington Post, October 24, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/10/24/us-boat-strike-caribbean-hegseth/; Time, “U.S. Military Kills 14 in Strikes…,” October 27, 2025, https://time.com/7328921/cartel-boats-pete-hegseth-pacific/.
6. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Venezuela’s State Gold Mining Company and Its President,” March 19, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm631
7. Human Rights Watch, “Venezuela: Violent Abuses in Illegal Gold Mines,” February 4, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/04/venezuela-violent-abuses-illegal-gold-mines; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2024: Venezuela, “Mining and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/venezuela.
8. Aimee Gabay, “Amid Venezuela’s Illegal Gold Heist Are Armed Groups, Gangs & Elites, Report Says,” Mongabay, October 2, 2025, https://news.mongabay.com/2025/10/amid-venezuelas-illegal-gold-heist-are-armed-groups-gangs-elites-report-says/.
9. London Bullion Market Association, Responsible Gold Guidance, Version 9 (London: LBMA, 2021), https://www.lbma.org.uk/publications/responsible-gold-guidance-v9; OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (Paris: OECD, 2016), https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2016/04/oecd-due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-supply-chains-of-minerals-from-conflict-affected-and-high-risk-areas_g1g65996.html.
10. Al Jazeera, “Fact Check: Do a Quarter of U.S.’s ‘Drug Boat’ Searches Find Nothing?,” October 27, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/27/fact-check-do-quarter-of-uss-drug-boat-searches-find-nothing; LBMA, “Guidance Documents,” accessed October 31, 2025, https://www.lbma.org.uk/responsible-sourcing/guidance-documents.
11. OECD, “Responsible Mineral Supply Chains,” accessed October 31, 2025, https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-business-conduct/responsible-mineral-supply-chains.html.
12. K2 Integrity, “United States Eases Venezuela Sanctions,” October 19, 2023, https://www.k2integrity.com/en/knowledge/policy-alerts/united-states-eases-venezuela-sanctions-following-agreement-between-maduro-regime-and-opposition/; Baker McKenzie, “U.S. Government Ends Authorization to Deal with Minerven,” March 2024, https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/us-government-ends-authorization-to-deal-with-sanctioned-party-in-venezuelan-mining-sector-and-warns-that-us-sanctions-targeting-venezuela-may-be-reimposed-soon/.
13. LBMA, “Good Delivery Current List—Gold,” accessed October 31, 2025, https://www.lbma.org.uk/good-delivery/gold-current-list; SEMPSA JP, Refiner’s Compliance Report (FY2022 Audit), March 28, 2023, https://cdn.lbma.org.uk/gdl-downloads/Sempsa-FY2022-audit-for-website.pdf; Eurojust, “Criminal Networks Dismantled for Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering via Trade in Gold Bars,” September 24, 2025, https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/criminal-networks-dismantled-drug-trafficking-and-money-laundering-trade-gold-bars.
14. “Guyana to Crack Down on Gold Smuggled in from Venezuela at the Urging of the US Government,” Associated Press, October 30, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/guyana-gold-smuggling-us-venezuela-7638cfb0f9975f0561e93e2e9616d565.
15. Reuters, “LBMA’s New Database for Gold Bars Will Be Mandatory from 2027,” October 27, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/lbmas-new-database-gold-bars-will-be-mandatory-listed-refineries-2027-2025-10-27/; Washington Post timeline and casualty counts for the boat campaign, October 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/10/28/drug-boat-strike-mexico-pacific-hegseth/.
16. Responsible Gold Guidance
17. Global Forest Watch or MAAP datasets can be cited if used for satellite analysis; see also Associated Press and Reuters items above for policy milestones and data points.