The Rule of Law is in Jeopardy in Hungary and Poland: What This Means For the EU
By Alex Jung, University of Chicago
For several decades, the European Union (EU) has been a leading example of regional cooperation. Various reforms, such as the standardization of currency and the establishment of unified regional laws, enable the EU to function as a unified force while still allowing individual states to exercise their internal sovereignty. EU law covers “exclusive competencies” where the EU can pass laws on trade agreements or monetary policy, “shared competencies” where state-led policies can be enacted, such as public health and transportation, and “supporting competencies” in which the EU can be involved with policies regarding culture, education, and sport.[1] Member states are expected to both follow EU laws and maintain EU values within their governments. In the extreme cases of violation of EU laws, Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) is used as “a last resort to safeguard the EU's founding values.”[2] Article 7 of the EU Treaty is a powerful mechanism that can be used against a member state to suspend its membership rights for breaching democracy, rule of law, or human rights. Article 7 has only been invoked against two member states: Hungary and Poland. Both states have been accused of violating the rule of law. Ultimately, this article aims to investigate and analyze the impact Article 7 has had upon the governance of Hungary and Poland, the implications it has upon the EU, and argue the importance of EU Cooperation.
It is important to note that Article 7 is different from Article 50, which was demonstrated in the Brexit referendum held in 2016.[3] Article 50 “sets out the procedure for a Member State to withdraw from the European Union, if it should wish to do so.”[4] Article 7, unlike Article 50's voluntary nature, can suspend the EU membership rights of a member state through a voting procedure
In the case of Hungary, where “no serving leader in the European Union has led their country for as long as Viktor Orbán,” the European Parliament has strongly denounced Orbán's philosophies of “illiberal democracy” and “Christian liberty”; two far-right value systems that strengthen Orbán's control and sovereignty.[5] In the case of Poland, the Law and Justice Party (PiS), which had strong conservative social values, including a constitutional ban on abortion, led to the European Commission launching legal action against Poland, citing “concerns over the independence of the judiciary and the ‘rule of law’ in the country.”[6] Though Human Rights Watch claims both Poland and Hungary continued to “strengthen its grip on the judiciary” and “intensify its attacks on the rule of law” both states reacted to Article 7 in very different ways over time.[7] With an understanding of the nature of Article 7, an exploration into Hungary and Poland can highlight the erosion of the rule of EU law and its impacts.
In September of 2018, the European Council triggered the Article 7(1) procedure against Hungary.[8] [9] The erosion of the rule of law in Hungary is not a new nor unexpected phenomenon, but rather a systematic and deep-rooted occurrence.[10] Hungary's erosion of the rule of law has regional implications, as ultimately the EU cannot claim to be democratic, provided one of its member states violates the principles of democracy.[11] This erosion can be viewed through two important pillars: Orbán's ideology and the policies through which his ideology manifested. His main ideology, which he frequently cites, of “illiberal democracy” and “Christian democracy,” was designed to convince conservative Europeans that they were “being ill-treated and disrespected in contemporary liberal democracies.”[12] While a state maintaining conservative values does not directly erode the rule of law, Orbán used his ideology to justify monoculturalism, anti-immigration, and traditional family norms within the state. Significantly, far-right ideology has been reflected in his reforms. Firstly, freedom of speech has been targeted as the government consolidates political power through maintaining “control of public space by control mechanisms in the media”; significantly, “every third journalist admits to having withheld or distorted information to avoid negative consequences.”[13] Secondly, academic institutions have been targeted through “lack of financing of certain disciplines such as gender studies, privatizing universities in the hands of loyalists, restructuring funding, and censorship.”[14] The restrictions on academic freedom significantly threaten the long-term future of intellectual development and the exchange of ideas globally. Finally, NGOs have also been targeted with the establishment of “GONGO's” which are NGOs that are designed to “amplify the government's narrative.”[15] Thus, Orbán's ideologies have not remained theoretical ideas, but have manifested in various branches of Hungarian life. The European Parliament identified and acknowledged these key areas of breaches to the rule of law, with 399/544 voting in favor of invoking Article 7 on Hungary. The EU claims that Hungary has “serious deficiencies related to the justice system, media freedom, fundamental rights… and the functioning of civil society.”[16] However, Article 7, due to its difficulty in enforcing, has had no tangible consequence on the nation, and to a large extent was ineffective. In 2025, Hungary passed a new “anti-Pride law” in which the “depiction and promotion of homosexuality and diverse gender identities to people under 18” has been outlawed; violations can lead to criminal charges and up to one year imprisonment.[17] With no checks on Orbán's power or his ideologies, Hungary's authoritarian ideas remain promoted.
The trajectory of Poland's Article 7 ruling differed greatly from that of Hungary's. In the case of Poland, the European Commission stated “there is no longer a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law in Poland within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union” in May of 2024.[18] This is a stark contrast to the current state of Hungary. The newly elected prime minister, Donald Tusk of the Civic Platform Party, “moved fast to repair diplomatic ties and turn the page on the dispute.”[19] This article will, in particular, analyze the erosion of the rule of law through the restriction of reproductive rights in Poland. According to the European Commission, there was a “common pattern” whereby “executive and legislative branches have been systematically enabled to politically interfere in the composition, powers, administration and functioning of the judicial branch.”[20] It was this interference of the state into the court that led to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in October 2020 outlawing abortions, making Poland among “the European countries with the most restrictive abortion laws.”[21] The erosion of the rule of law is highlighted in Joe Neumeyer's article “Poland’s Abortion Ban Protests Changed the Country Forever.”[22] Following failed attempts to pass legislation to make abortion illegal, the Law and Justice Party, which had illegally appointed several judges, “asked Poland's Constitutional Tribunal to review the existing law.”[23] This demonstrates the direct involvement the Law and Justice Party has had in altering the outcome of constitutional laws. With the use of Article 7 against Poland being revoked, an atmosphere of optimism was evident; Prime Minister Donald Tusk, the liberal prime minister of the Civic Platform Party, promised access to free and safe abortions within 100 days of office.[24] Nonetheless, in July 2024, the Polish Parliament failed to vote through a bill that would counteract the Law and Justice Party's judgment.[25] This raises an important point; while Article 7 may have a significant impact on imposing sanctions or recommendations to its member states in terms of its position with the EU, it ultimately has little to no effect on the internal governance of the state or reforming state laws.
Through the case studies of Poland and Hungary, it can therefore be concluded that Article 7 is not designed to punish a state to a large degree or significantly alter state laws. However, the use of Article 7 can be seen more broadly in the ongoing efforts of the EU to standardise its values, which would ultimately streamline its reforms that position it as a strong regional body. These reforms justify the importance and successes of the EU as an institution. In order to accomplish these liberal reforms, cooperation from all member states is critical. However, the use of Article 7 against Poland and Hungary revealed the inconsistencies in the perspectives that member states have held, making unity difficult. While these are examples of two radical governments, Marian Tupy, an Editor at the Cato Institute's Center for Global Liberty, claims that the unity of EU ideals would be impossible regardless. He presents the realist claim that “the nation-state remains the basic building block of international relations, including European.”[26] This suggests, like Orbán and the Law of Justice Party, that the state ultimately prioritizes its interests and security over the interests and security of the EU. Secondly, unlike the widely known pan-Asianism or pan-Africanism, the concept of pan-European demos “does not exist”; this is due to European identities not being formed “by attachment to abstract principles such as liberty, equality, and fraternity, but by cultural, religious, historical, and linguistic ties.”[27]
In conclusion, Article 7 on Hungary and Poland questions its importance in the broader functioning of the EU. The right to freedom of speech and information in Hungary and the challenges to reproductive rights in Poland remain critical social issues today, regardless of the EU's reforms. It is difficult to decisively conclude whether Article 7 has been effectively used or abused. However, it can reveal the broader culture of the EU as an institution that may be unified on the surface but is often individualistic in its policies and priorities. Ultimately, while there are still several ongoing challenges to the EU and the domestic challenges member states face, the institution remains an optimistic symbol of the effectiveness of regional cooperation.
[1] James McBride, “How Does the European Union Work?” Council on Foreign Relations, March 11, 2022,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-european-union-work.
[2] “Article 7 Procedures,” European Council of the European Union, March 6, 2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/article-7-procedures/.
[3] Michael White, “What Is Brexit and Why Does It Matter? The EU Referendum Guide for Americans,” Guardian, June 18, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/18/eu-referendum-brexit-explainer-for-americans.
[4] “Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union – Q&A,” European Commission, March 28, 2017,
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_17_648.
[5] Nick Thorpe, “Who Is Viktor Orban, Hungarian PM with 14-year Grip on Power?” BBC, February 13, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67832416.
[6] Stefano Fella, “Poland: The Law and Justice Government and relations with the EU, 2015-2023,” UK Parliament, February 13, 2024, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9868/.
[7] “EU: Use Article 7 Now to Protect European Values,” Human Rights Watch, October 28, 2015,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/18/eu-use-article-7-now-protect-european-values.
[8] “Timeline - Article 7: The Story So Far,” European Council, February 6, 2025,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/article-7-procedures/timeline-the-story-of-article-7/.
[9] Daniel Hegedüs, “European Parliament’s Article 7 against Hungary Not a Nuclear Option, but the Right Step,” GMF, September 13, 2018,
[10] Zoé Kappes, “Why the EU Must Trigger the Article 7(2) TEU Procedure against Hungary,” Transparency International EU, January 19, 2024,
https://transparency.eu/why-the-eu-must-trigger-the-article-72-teu-procedure-against-hungary/.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Lydia Gall, “Hungary’s Latest Assault on the Judiciary,” Human Rights Watch, December 14, 2018,
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/illiberal-democracy-and-the-struggle-on-the-right/.
[13] “Systematic Backsliding of the Rule of Law in Hungary – Overview of the Scholarly Papers,” Netherlands Helsinki Committee, May 3, 2022,
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] “Rule of Law in Hungary: Parliament Condemns the “Sovereignty Act,” European Parliament, April 24, 2024, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240419IPR20579/rule-of-law-in-hungary-parliament-condemns-the-sovereignty-act.
[17] “Hungary: Global Fight Back Begins as Anti-Pride Law Comes into Effect,” Amnesty International, April 15, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/04/hungary-global-fight-back-begins-as-anti-pride-law-comes-into-effect/.
[18] “Commission Intends to Close Article 7(1) TEU Procedure for Poland,” European Commission, May 5, 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2461.
[19] Jorge Liboreiro, “Poland Exits Article 7, the EU's Special Procedure on Rule of Law,” Euronews, May 29, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/05/29/poland-exits-article-7-the-eus-special-procedure-on-rule-of-law.
[20] Alice Cuddy, “What Is ‘Article 7’ and Why Was It Triggered against Poland?” Euronews, December 20, 2017, https://www.euronews.com/2017/12/20/what-is-article-7standardize-and-why-was-it-triggered-against-poland-.
[21] “Poland: Abortion Made Illegal in 2020,” International Federation For Human Rights, September 28, 2022, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/poland/poland-abortion-made-illegal-in-2020.
[22] Joe Neumeyer, “Poland’s Abortion Ban Protests Changed the Country Forever,” Foreign Policy, November 8, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/08/poland-abortion-ban-women-strike-catholic-religion-progressive-politics/.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Anna Blus, “A Year after Tusk Came to Power, Why Is Access to Safe and Legal Abortion Still a Distant Dream in Poland?” Amnesty International, October 15, 2024,
[25] Ibid.
[26] Marian Tupy, “The European Union: A Critical Assessment,” CATO Institute, June 22, 2016,
[27] Ibid.
