Facing the Dragon at Sea: Preparations for a Modern War Against China

David Peirce, University of Chicago

Introduction

During the 21st century, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly encircled the island of Taiwan, launching bold military exercises in displays of sovereignty over the Republic of China (ROC), commonly known as “Taiwan.” This trend is unlikely to end thanks to the Anti-Secession Law of 2005, which grants the PRC authority to use military force against Taiwanese independence, and Xi Jinping’s expansion of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) suggests preparedness for conflict.[1] It is the common view among the mainland Chinese population that Taiwan is an integral part of China, and reunification is a political priority for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the ruling force in the PRC.[2]

Although the United States of America has officially recognized that “there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China” since 1979, Taiwan remains a vital consideration for the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and the US Navy (USN).[3] US military strategy against Taiwan rests on the ability to maneuver forces from Japan, Guam, or the Philippines close to the Chinese coast, which provides power projection and area denial. A large part of this strategy rests on the “First Island Chain,” the string of islands between southern Japan and the northern Philippines, which includes Taiwan, because the First Island Chain contains the Chinese navy and prevents its movement into the wider Pacific Ocean.[4]

However, increased Chinese aggression within Taiwanese waters, combined with technological and numerical developments within the PLA, have made the USN position more and more precarious. The purpose of this article is to examine the American naval context in and around Taiwan and provide suggestions to ensure deterrence and, ultimately, effectiveness in the case of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Historical and Strategic Context

Since its rapid development during the Second World War, the USN has served a key role in American power projection, allowing the US to deploy massive power to coastal regions across the globe. This includes managing the conflict between the PRC and Taiwan, two governments that claim to be the legitimate Chinese government and do not recognize each other diplomatically.

Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the US leveraged its newfound naval power by sending the 7th Fleet, currently the largest forward-deployed fleet in the USN, into the Taiwan Strait, preventing a PRC takeover of the island.[5] Since then, the USN has repulsed PRC forces in three separate Taiwan Strait crises in 1954, 1958, and 1996, utilizing carriers and logistics ships from the 7th Fleet to discourage the PLA from bombarding vulnerable Taiwanese positions in Kinmen and Mazu while also resupplying Taiwanese troops.[5] Despite overtures towards possible escalation, the presence of the USN in the Taiwan Strait repeatedly resulted in PRC de-escalation and the withdrawal of PRC forces from the nearby area. In the 20th century, China knew that it could not challenge American naval dominance.

Since then, however, China has rapidly expanded its naval capabilities to the point where it can challenge US naval and aerial superiority. During the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, the USN responded to PLA troop amassments, SRBM and SAM tests, and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait with two major carriers, the USS Nimitz and the USS Independence.[6] The PLA ended its escalation following the USN display of power.[6] Worryingly, Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) might no longer be such a powerful deterrent. 

As far back as 1999, PLA advancements in missile and electronic warfare have created US-side doubts surrounding the USN’s continued reliance on large ships to keep China at bay. [6] Today, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) possesses extensive antiship missile capabilities and advanced electronic warfare (EW) technologies able to seriously challenge US naval superiority. These include ballistic missiles capable of targeting vulnerable ships as well as EW units such as the PLA’s “92728 Unit,” which claims to be able to disrupt electronics aboard USN carriers.[7][8] Additionally, the PLAN has undergone rapid expansion in the past 10 years, operating 234 active service warships in 2023. This count surpassed the USN’s warship count sometime between 2015 and 2022, with variations between sources—According to O’Rourke, the PLAN surpassed the USN in active service ship count “sometime between 2015 and 2020,” while Palmer et al. put that moment between 2021 and 2022, drawing on data from “The Military Balance 2024” by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.[9][10]  

While China remains behind the US in large ships such as aircraft carriers, with small ships making up the majority of Chinese naval expansion, they have recently made strides in growing their arsenal. The PLAN has gained two new carriers, “Liaoning” and “Shandong,” in the past decade, and is currently testing its new carrier “Fujian,” the first of China’s domestically designed carriers.[11][12] According to Chinese state media, the Fujian is expected to achieve battle readiness by the end of 2026. [13] Due to growing Chinese naval power, near-future confrontation and military escalation in the Taiwan Strait could result in devastating losses of American manpower, fleet strength, and munitions.[14]

The PRC’s increasing disregard for the American military matches paramount Leader Xi Jinping’s rhetoric of “东升西降” (literally “east rises, west falls”).[15] This saying, which outlines Xi’s image for the world order in the 21st century, refers to a rebalancing of the world order where Western, and specifically American, interests are no longer the focus of global affairs. Instead, Xi envisions a multipolar world with the PRC, rather than America, as a leading but not hegemonic force at the forefront of a new world order.[16] This Chinese order certainly includes a vision of reunification with Taiwan, which China calls “Chinese Taipei” and considers a “rebellious province” of the Beijing government.[2]

Expansion and Diversification of the US Pacific Fleet

The first and most important part of continued competition with the PLAN is expanding and changing the composition of the US Pacific Fleet, the naval component of INDOPACOM. Although China’s numerical advantage does not currently translate to higher quality ships, with the US still possessing more aircraft carriers, guided missile cruisers, submarines, and large warships such as destroyers, China is rapidly increasing the number of these high-quality ships in active service.[17][7] Furthermore, although the bulk of recent PLAN expansion consists of small ships such as corvettes, the US Pacific Fleet is in danger of being significantly outnumbered, even when combined with Taiwan’s small navy.[10]

In terms of diversification, while it is important to continue construction of large carriers and other expensive ships, the US Pacific Fleet should also include a larger number of small, relatively inexpensive ships with great firepower in order to match the PLAN. This strategy falls in line with the USN’s 2025 Shipbuilding Plan, which seeks to “buy more small surface combatants than any other category of ship.”[18] Such diversification and enlargement of firepower would also reduce the efficacy of targeted Chinese antiship missiles and electronic attacks, which are most effective at attacking isolated large ships like aircraft carriers. 

This diversification effort intentionally goes against traditional US naval strategy, which emphasizes Carrier Strike Groups as a central piece of deterrence and offensive capacity. Although aircraft carriers are vital for US power projection, their low survivability in the face of modern technologies possessed by the PLA and PLAN cannot justify their massive costs.[19] Their value as a deterring force was highly valuable during the past three crises in the Taiwan Strait, but in present times, China commands a far stronger naval presence, and carriers pose a smaller threat to a more dynamic PLAN.[20][6]

Targeted Strategies for Missile Warfare

In the 21st century, the PLAN has significantly increased its ability to target and incapacitate individual USN ships, especially aircraft carriers, as well as US planes, with innovative missile systems. The PLA employs a variety of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), antiship missiles, and ballistic missiles.[14] To use these missiles, China has developed LUYANG-II and LUYANG-III class destroyers, which provide medium-range missile support against aircraft and ships and possess both SAM and antiship missile capabilities.[7] 

LUYANG-capable missiles include the HHQ-9, a surface-to-air missile with 55 nautical miles of range, as well as the YJ-83 and YJ-62 families of Antiship Cruise Missile (ASCM) systems fired from LUYANG-II class destroyers with the ability to destroy large US ships such as carriers.[7] These ASCMs are particularly worrying because they can destroy large ships from a significant distance, potentially crippling a USN aircraft carrier before it can respond to PLAN movements during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.[7] The PLA also utilizes a variety of ballistic missiles, rocket-guided missiles launched from static land platforms, with potential for use in the Indo-Pacific during a confrontation between the PLAN and USN near Taiwan.[21]

In response to this diverse threat, the US Pacific Fleet needs the ability to intercept or confuse Chinese missiles. The use of interception systems such as the MIM-104 Patriot, an antiaircraft/antimissile system capable of intercepting ballistic and cruise missiles as well as aircrafts, which the US already plans on arming its ships with, can protect expensive and vulnerable ships against Chinese SRBMs.[22][23] Additionally, part of USN expansion should include building more ships with systems such as the Aegis Ballistic-Missile Defense system, of which the USN currently has 53, and other systems listed in the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Vision 2028, INDOPACOM’s published plan for greater missile defense capabilities.[24][25] These defense systems would serve a dual purpose: not only are they able to intercept Chinese missiles, but they can also shoot down Chinese planes conducting EW. Second, the US can deceive Chinese missile targeting, simulating aircraft carrier heat emissions with smaller, unmanned ships and causing the missiles to overlook large targets.[21] In doing so, the US would force China to rely on bombers and ships to attack the US fleet, leaving the PLAN vulnerable against unscathed larger USN ships with aircraft.[21]

Targeted Strategies for Electronic Warfare

In addition to a variety of offensive and defensive missile systems, the modern PLA and PLAN possess extensive EW capabilities. According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “electronic warfare,” also known as “electromagnetic warfare” and abbreviated as EW, refers to “military action that exploits electromagnetic energy to provide situational awareness and create offensive and defensive effects,” and includes anything “from attacks on radar systems, to jamming of communications and navigation systems, to electronic masking, probing, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering.”[26] This style of attack contributes to China’s anti-area access denial (A2/AD) capabilities, creating spaces in which the US and Taiwanese militaries could not properly operate. 

Specific areas of concern for the US Pacific Fleet and USINDOPACOM in the Taiwan Strait include electronic attacks on radar or other navigation systems as well as the jamming of fleet communications. The PLA can conduct electronic warfare against USN systems from static ground facilities as well as from planes equipped with electronic warfare systems. As of 2024, the Department of Defense understands the aims of PLA EW as “suppressing, degrading, disrupting, or deceiving enemy electronic equipment throughout the continuum of a conflict.”[12] This breakdown of communications would provide the PLAN with an advantage over large American ships and could prove deadly to the US Pacific Fleet in a fast-paced naval engagement. In addition to the PLA’s “EW units,” the PLA likely has extensive aerial EW capabilities.[8][12] For example, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, the primary aerial warfare branch of the PLA, recently added to service a J-20 stealth jet with sensors capable of EW activities such as signal jamming.[14] Another prominent example of Chinese EW and A2/AD comes in the form of the J-16D, which can jam both American fighter planes and Taiwanese ground radar.[27] The PLAN has also developed drones with electronic warfare capabilities, confusing radar systems by appearing to represent larger bodies.[28]

Although the targeted destruction of Chinese EW capabilities will partially protect the US Pacific Fleet against EW, the USN must also assess and fix vulnerabilities in its electronic systems. The Cooperative Engagement Capability, for example, which makes up part of an aircraft carrier’s air defenses, must be patched immediately to prevent the kind of probing which the PLA claims to be capable of.[8] The USN should also examine pieces of equipment, including radar and comms, which have come under threat. Missile defense systems, unmanned ships with heat emission masking, and EW prevention systems are all necessary parts of the USN’s buildup to combat the PLAN. The F-35 Lighting II, for instance, uses the AN/ASQ-239 electronic warfare suite, an EW and counter-EW architecture integrated into the F-35’s systems.[29]

Concluding Thoughts

As the Chinese government uses increasingly threatening language against Taiwan and other neighbors, conducts military activities in and around the Taiwan Strait, ramps up military production and innovation, and suggests desires for an eastern-focused world order, the United States must be prepared for the very real possibility of a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. Depending on the intentions of the CCP, any actions could result in a protracted crisis or even a war in Taiwan and the wider Indo-Pacific. 

As shown by wargames conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2023, such a US-China confrontation in or around the Taiwan Strait would be incredibly costly.[14] The CSIS wargame suggests that the US could only reliably defend Taiwan if forces were mobilized at full strength within a matter of days, and even then projects the loss of several hundred aircraft and dozens of ships by the US in their most likely scenario.[14]

However, the United States can take many steps to strengthen itself against an increasingly technologically and strategically advanced Chinese navy. First, the US Pacific Fleet needs not just enlargement but diversification, with an emphasis on smaller ships with flexible roles rather than relying on vulnerable aircraft carriers and their support networks. Additionally, a dedicated stockpile of anti-missile systems and the integration of such systems into the US Navy can reduce the threat of Chinese missiles. Finally, the reinforcement or creation of counter-EW systems is vital on increasingly electronic battlefields. 

If the US can take these steps, it can reduce casualties and improve efficacy in the opening steps of a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, placing itself in an advantageous position to defend Taiwan if such a crisis were to spiral into a long-term regional war. Given the massive distance across the Pacific and the small size of the island, every plane, ship, missile, and soldier matters.

Notes

[1] USINDOPACOM Joint Operational Law Team. The PRC's Anti-Succession Law. USINDOPАСОМ J06/SJA TACAID Series. 2022. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://www.pacom.mil/Portals/55/Documents/pdf/J06%20TACAID%20-%20ANTI-SECESSION%20LAW.pdf?ver=y_O5AhC7TDhmSwdtWV3H9w%3D%3D. 

[2] Li, David Daokui. China's World View, 24. W. W. Norton & Company, 2024.

[3] "Address by President Carter to the Nation." Office of the Historian. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d104.

[4] Erickson, Andrew S., and Joel Wuthnow. "Barriers, Springboards and Benchmarks: China Conceptualizes the Pacific 'Island Chains.'" The China Quarterly 225 (March 2016): 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741016000011.

[5] United States Navy, "History," Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Subs-and-Squadrons/.

[6] Porch, Douglas. “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy.” Naval War College Review 52, no. 3 (1999): 15–48. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44643008.

[7] United States Navy Office of Naval Intelligence, The People's Liberation Army Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, 2015. https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Interactive.pdf?ver=2015-12-02-081058-483.

[8] Stephen Chen, "PLA releases electronic warfare 'kill list' for US carrier groups," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong, China), December 16, 2024, https://sc.mp/zf2h2?utm_source=copy link&utm_campaign=3290477&utm_medium=share_widget.

[9] Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, report no. RL33153, 2, August 16, 2024, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/25051981/china-naval-modernization-implications-for-us-navy-capabilities-background-and-issues-for-congress-updated-august-16-2024-congressional-research-service.pdf.

[10] Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, Unpacking China's Naval Buildup, June 5, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-chinas-naval-buildup. 

[11] Louis Bearn and Nick Childs, "China's Aircraft Carriers Begin to Spread Their Wings," Military Balance Blog, November 25, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/11/chinas-aircraft-carriers-begin-to-spread-their-wings/.

[12] Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 49, 2024, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF.

[13] USNI News. "PLAN Carrier Fujian Expected to Achieve Full Readiness This Year, Chinese State Media Says." April 20, 2026. https://news.usni.org/2026/04/20/plan-carrier-fujian-expected-to-achieve-full-readiness-this-year-chinese-state-media-says#.

[14] Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham, The First Battle of the Next War, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?VersionId=XlDrfCUHet8OZSOYW_9PWx3xtc0ScGHn.

[15] Xin, Bai. "客座评论：后疫情时代的'东升西降'" [Guest Commentary: The "Rise of the East and the Decline of the West" in the Post-Pandemic Era]. DW News, March 11, 2011. Accessed May 7, 2026. https://www.dw.com/zh/%E5%AE%A2%E5%BA%A7%E8%AF%84%E8%AE%BA%E5%90%8E%E7%96%AB%E6%83%85%E6%97%B6%E4%BB%A3%E7%9A%84%E4%B8%9C%E5%8D%87%E8%A5%BF%E9%99%8D/a-56842380.

[16] Poast, Paul. "Does Xi Actually Want China to Lead the Global Order?" World Politics Review,  September 12, 2025. Accessed May 7, 2026. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/china-xi-international-order/.

[17] Harrison Kass, "China vs. U.S. Navy: Which Fighting Force on the Water Is Stronger?," The National Interest, August 12, 2024, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-vs-us-navy-which-fighting-force-water-stronger-212291

[18] Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy's 2025 Shipbuilding Plan, 34, January 6, 2025, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-01/60732-shipbuilding.pdf.

[19] United States Marine Corps. The Future of Power Projection - Is the US Navy Aircraft Carrier Still Worthwhile? By Joseph B. Sims. 2016. Accessed April 27, 2026. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1176343.pdf.

[20] Office of the Historian. "The Taiwan Straits Crises: 1954–55 and 1958." Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises

[21] Smith, John Scott. "Air and Missile Defense in the Western Pacific." In "The American Sea Power Project," special issue, Proceedings, January 2024. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/january/air-and-missile-defense-western-pacific.

[22] Mike Stone and Gerry Doyle, "Fearing China's Hypersonic Weapons, US Navy Seeks to Arm Ships with Patriot Missiles," Reuters (London, England), October 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/fearing-chinas-hypersonic-weapons-us-navy-seeks-arm-ships-with-patriot-missiles-2024-10-25/.

[23] Missile Defense Project, "Patriot," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified June 14, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/patriot/. 

[24] Missile Defense Project,"Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified August 4, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/aegis/.

[25] Savage, Lynn. "US INDOPACOM's Integrated Air and Missile Defense Vision 2028." Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, January 2022, 1-10. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jan/27/2002929057/-1/-1/1/JIPA%20-%20SAVAGE.PDF.

[26] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Electromagnetic Warfare," Topics, last modified March 22, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/in/natohq/topics_80906.htm.

[27] Eastwood, Brent M. "China's J-16D Is an Electronic Warfare 'Nightmare' for the U.S. Navy." The National Interest, September 6, 2024. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-j-16d-electronic-warfare-nightmare-us-navy-207399.

[28] Stephen Chen, "China's Electronic War Gadget Turns Small Drone into Flying Stadium on Radar," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong, China), January 17, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3294661/chinese-military-tests-electronic-war-gadget-turns-drone -giant-ufo.

[29] Myers, Nick. "AN/ASQ-239 F-35 EW countermeasure system." BAE Systems. https://www.baesystems.com/en/product/an-asq-239-f-35-ew-countermeasure-system.